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CAPITAL UTILISATION IN K M A MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
By 
Mary Ami BaAXy 
ABSTRACT 
This paper is a summary oi : isain conclusions of the author's Ph,B, 
thesis which has> - - :>z -title, Basel on a fourteen-month study of Kenyan 
manufacturing, the basic question of the thesis is: why should rational entrepreneurs 
capital which, they plan to use for less jthan the maximum number of hours 
per week9 
Two behavioural models are examined: the'shift differential model, in which 
it is assumed that here are extra costs.associated with operating outside ormal 
daytime working hou .*£> to be weighed off against the savings in capital cost, gained 
by using capital more hours; and the minimim size of plant model, which assumes that 
one cannot buy less than a certain amount of capital, and because of limits on the 
demand for output, the firm's chosen output is less than the output of Q capital 
when used the maximum number of hours. 
The major conclusion xl . -a- In Kenya utilisation rates and therefore the 
ratios of output and labour to capita stock are sensitive to the factor-price ratio 
even in the case where coefficients are fixed _ex ante and ex j^ ost® In the case of the 
minimum siae of plant model, the most important reason for market limitation is trade 
policy which favours import substitutes and discourages exports* 
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INTRODUCTION 
In most developing countries investment opportunities are plentiful 
and unemployment is highs ^ investment funds are scarce. Furthermore , .many 
investment goods must come from abroad, but it is often difficult for these 
countries to export enough y,t existing exchange rates to euxn the foreign exchange 
necessary to buy all the foreign goods they want. 
Common sense suggests that In. such a situation a country would want to 
get the most out of the capital goods it does buy. Since labour is relatively 
abundant and cheap compared to advanced countries? one would expect entrepreneurs 
to choose labourer tensive production methods to economise on capital. In 
practice, it may not be easy vo do thisg there may be a limited number of reliable • 
techniques available, .But whatever techniques are chosen, one vould. expect capital 
to be used as intensively as possible,, 
Despite this presumption, development economists have become concerned 
at growing evidence of serious excess capacity in, capital-scarce countries, The 
concept of 'full capacity output" is a slippexy me, but whatever the complications 
involved in defining 1 efficient utilisation of capital8, one aspect of it seems 
relatively uncontroversials One would expect firms to do wliatever they are 
doing with their capital for as many hours a year as possible® 
Nevertheless9 it has been argued that in less-developed countries 
capital is used for many fewer hours a year than it could be used, T'he policy 
significance is clear. If policies can be devised to raise utilisation rates, 
it may be possible to get more emplqyment and output from the same capital expenditure. 
Planned anc- Ac tual Utilisation Rates 
The maximum number of hours per year that a given kind of capital coul>t 
be used is determined by engineering constraints,' e.g., required maintenance time,, 
Define the planned utilisation rafce to be the ratio of the number of Kourfe the 
entrepreneur intends to operate the plant to 'the maximum possible^ it refers to 
tlie rate he has in mind when lie builds the plant. 
On the one hand, it is desirable to sav.:. cn capital costs by planning 
to use the capital as many hours a, day as possible,. On the other hand, there may 
be additional costs of running multi-shift operations,, Fluctuations in the dwini 
for output or the supply of inputs may be expected? part of these fluctuations 
may be met by seme capacity which will be used only in periods of pea£ demand or 
supply, particularly if the good is perishable. If demand is growing ovc-c ti&r., 
IDS/DP/206 - 2 -
economies of scale an^or adjustment costs may make it rational to 'build ahead of 
demand*. After considering such factors, the manager will set a planned rate (or 
planned rates, as a function of time) which may well be less than the maximum--but 
a priori, one would expect it to be relatively high in a developing country because 
of the scarcity of capital® 
Plans do not always work out, especially in a developing country. Demand 
may turn out to be less than it was expected to be,, There may be an unanticipated 
shortage of raw materials, skilled labour or transport facilities. Costs may 
change unexpectedly„ These may be largely the entrepreneur's 'fault'—• he made 
unrealistic predictions— or they may be the result of quite unforseeable events such 
as very unusual weather conditions. Actual utilisation rates may be higher or lower 
than planned. 
It is quite important to disentangle the two aspects. Suppose, for example, 
that low actual rates are found in a particular industry and when asked why they do 
not operate longer hours, the managers answer 'because we could not sell the output'«, 
It is necessary to distinguish between the case where their demand forecasts have 
proved to be wrong and they are operating fewer hours then they planned, and the 
case where- their demand forecasts are correct and they always planned to operate 
at this rate. In the second case, the manager's answer that he 'cannot sell the 
output' is the wrong one. He has not explained why if he knew how much he could 
sell he did not build a smaller plant and produce that output running several shifts. 
The policy implications are obviously different depending on whether low actual 
rates represent low planned rates that are being met, or high planned rates that are 
not being met. For example, in the first case above, if Government stimulates demand, 
utilisation rates will go up. In the second case, the industry is likely to build 
more capacity« 
This research project was primarily concerned with the determination of 
planned utilisation rates in manufacturings What are they? Why are they what they 
are? Can they be raised and if so, what policy instruments should be used to raise 
them? We also investigated these questions with respect to differences between 
planned and actual utilisation, ratesa 
The main sources of information were interviews with representatives of 
121 manufacturing firms in Kenya and quantitative data from a study of Capital/ 
Labour, Capital/Output and Labour/Output ratios in the manufacturing sector of the 
Kenyan economy by Frank Thompson of the Department of Economics, University of Leeds, 
England. This information was supplemented by information from the 1971 Capacity 
Survey of Manufacturing Industry at the three digit industry level conducted by the 
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Kenya Bureau of Statistics, the Phelps-Wasow Study of Effective Rates of Protection 
and Bureau of Statistics data on firms in three specific industries; beverages5 
garments and made-up textiles; rubber and rubber products,, (Chapter 3 of the 
full research report describes the data in detail.) 
The evidence is that most manufacturers in Kenya do not plan to use 
their capital equipment for the number of hours per week that they think it is 
possible to use it. (Note; this was defined as the maximum possible aa a 
long-term basis doing all necessary preventive maintenance.) This could, of 
course, be merely a case of irrationality and inefficiency. However, there is 
good evidence that much of it is a rational response to economic factors over 
which Governement policy can have considerable influence. 
HOW PLANNED UTILISATION RATES ARE DETEBMINED 
A p riori analysis and early interviews suggested several hypotheses 
which might explain why entrepreneurs would choose to buy capital and use it for 
fewer than the maximum number of hours possible. In chapter 2 of the research 
report, these hypotheses are worked up in the form of mathematical models„ In that 
form, the assumptions can be made very, precise and their Implications for firm 
behaviour spelled out in detail and then checked against the data. Of pourse, 
it is not assumed that firms are actually able to make such exact detailed 
calculations, but merely that their behaviour will be a rough approximation of 
the optimal result, as they work towards it by trial and error. 
Here, we will merely summarise the main features of the models. There 
are two important factors; the shift differential factor; and the increasing returns 
factor combined with market demand limitations. 
Shift Differential 
The basic assumption is that there are extra costs associated with hiring 
labour to work at night. Thus the savings created by using the capital more hours 
per day must be balanced off against the higher cost of labour on the night shift. 
The implications of this are examined when the firm is producing under constant 
returns to scale, and either; l) there is only one technique in production, so 
that a given amount of output always requires given amounts of capital and labour 
inputs; or 2) there is a wide choice of techniques available before the machines are 
bought but once the factory is built and the machinery is in place, there is no 
possibility of substituting labour for capital. Since in most firms the production 
process is actually composed of a number of individual operations, the output of 
one being the input to the next, the firm may have the option of running some 
operations for more hours than others. Therefore the analysis is carried on at 
the production process levels 
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The general conclusion is that if firms are trying to minimise the cost 
of producing any particular output, the utilisation rate may be less than the 
maximum and will depend on the relative prices of labour and capital, the nature 
and size of the differential shift costs and the capitals-intensity of the production 
process5 
Increasing Returns to Scale 
Since there is widespread preoccupation in development economics with 
the sigaificance of scale economies and the "size of the market8 in less developed 
countries, the assumption of constant returns to scale is a serious limitation!, 
Therefore, three possible sources of increasing returns (in the sense of decreasing 
cost per unit of output as scale of output increases) are considered. 
A, There may be increasing returns to the enterprise but not within the 
individual production processest 
The simplest is the case where there are fixed costs which must be 
incurred regardless of the size of output, e„g.t, information costs, licensing 
costs, certain site development costs. More plausibly, there may be costs that 
are a function of output per time period, although invariant to whether the output 
is produced on a one or two-shift basis. These costs may be subject to increasing 
returns. For example, there may be scale economies in information-gathering, 
marketing, distribution, personnel administration, accounting. There may be scale 
economies in certain plant construction expenditures; for example, the amount of 
storage space needed may be a function of output per week and it may not cost 
proportionally more to build a larger warehouse. Costs of either type have no 
effect on the conditions determining the utilisation rate, although they obviously 
affect the choice of the profit-maximising output. Obviously, to the extent that 
capital expenditure is required for these purposes, the extent of capital savings 
to be expected from increased utilisation rates is lowerede 
There may be increasing returns at the production process level caused 
by indivisibilitiesj 
We assume in the shift differential model that capital and labour are 
perfectly divisible» In reality, machines may come in sizes. There are constant 
returns to scale as one goes up through the sizes, but the smallest size available 
produces more output at full utilisation than the firm wishes to produce, i.e«. 
there is a 'minimum size of plant'. 
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In the minimum size of plant models it 'turns out that it is not so much 
the technology that yields the low utilisation rate but the decision of the 
determination of output. If the firm maximises profits and if it can sell as much 
as it wants to at the going price, and if there is no shift differential, then it 
will always choose to produce an output which implies the highest possible 
utilisation rate. Therefore, this kind of excess capacity must be caused by some, 
kind of market constraint. The usual situation in Kenya is that the plant is set 
up to 'serve the Kenya (or East Africa) market' but the market is 'too small'. 
Obviously, such a plant would never be set up without some kind of protection 
(either by tariffs or transport costs) because it would be undersold by imports 
or would be competitive on the world market and could and would export, (Of 
course, this is an over-simplification in that it ignores the substantial costs of 
entry into the export market; we will return to this point later on.) 
c° Finally, there may be increasing returns at the production process level as 
one goes up the machine sizes. 
This model gives the result that a utilisation rate of less than the 
maximum may be optimal, even when there are no differential shift costs. The 
utilisation rate does not depend upon the level of output, but, if the firm could 
sell all it wanted at the going price, there would be an incentive to expand since 
average cost is decreasing with output. Presumably, the increasing returns could 
not hold indefinitely. At some output level, perhaps a very large one, constant or 
decreasing returns would set in, The production .function hypothesised is an 
approximation to the situation which might hold within a range of outputs. 
As in the minimum size of plant case, with no tariffs or transport costs 
such an industry would probably not be set up in Kenya, unless it could produce on 
a large enough scale to compete internationally. This presumably would mean beyond 
the point where there were significant increasing returns. Of course, there are 
tariffs and transport costs and the East African market is quite small, so that 
it is quite possible that certain Kenya firms are operating in a region of their 
production functions which can be approximated by these models. 
CQUCLUSIONS ffflCM EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
The Nature of Differential Shift Costs 
It was originally expected that a primary extra cost of a second shift 
would be a union-negotiated percentage of approximately 10 to 50 per cent added on 
to the basic wage for working on a night shift. Such explicit shift allowances 
turned out to be quite low or non-existent in most industries in Kenya, 
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although there were a few exceptions (for example, the Master Printers' Union 
gets a 15 per cent shift allowance)« Nevertheless, there proved to be other very 
significant extra costs to running night shifts,, Those costs emphasised most 
by the firms are the following,, 
1) Higher absenteeism on the night shift compared to the day shift. 
This means that the firms sometimes need to have extra workers on the night shift 
to be available to fill in for absentees. 
2) Difficulty in getting proper supervision on the night shift. It 
is possible to get supervisory personnel who will work at nighto Quite a few 
firms do, and the group includes both seme of the largest and most prestigious firms 
in Kenya, like the Kenya Breweries, and some very small Asian family operations. 
But such skilled personnel are in short supply, and if they prefer to work days, 
then even if the supervisor on the night shift is not actually paid more than his 
day counterpart, there may be extra search costs finding and keeping someone for 
the jobo Moreover, since the hiring of managerial and supervisory personnel is 
much closer to a bilateral bargaining situation than ordinary collective 
bargaining, the firm is likely to be aware of the influence of the requirement that 
a manager have night shift responsibilities on the basic salary he must be paid. 
It has been argued that 'management scale' is an important factor in 
very small firms—i.e., that supervisors are indivisible and that if the firm 
tried to buy half as many machines and run two shifts it would have to have two 
supervisors, because it could not put half a supervisor on each shift. This 
argument is similar to the 'minimum size of plant' argument, and it does not 
explain why the firm does not simply expand output until it is producing enough 
to justify one whole supervisor on each shift. Small firms are more likely than 
larger ones to be small relative to the market and hence to be able to sell 
more at the going price than they are producing. 
Finns often argue that the work permit system makes it impossible for 
them to get additional supervisors and therefore to put on additional shifts. The 
work permit system is undoubtedly an influence, but one must be quite careful in 
examining how it operates„ The basic principle of the system is that a noncitizen 
cannot be hired for any post unless there is no qualified Ker^ ya citizen available 
to fill the post. Firms are expected to take affirmative action to Kenyanise 
their work force, particularly at the middle management level <, In theory, this 
policy should have no effect an the availability of supervisors, since one can 
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hire a noncitizen if there are no Kenyans available. In practice, since the 
Kenyanisation Board is (legitimately) dubious about the good faith of the 
employers, many of whom have a past history of racial bias in their employment 
practices, it is difficult for the Board to assess the firm's requests for non-
citizen personnel. Therefore, there are extensive differences of opinion 
between the Board and the employers* 
There is admittedly a non-price rationing mechanism at work, This does 
not explain why the firms do not spread the supervisors they do get over three 
shifts; one must invoke the indivisibility argument again. The argument seems 
to be that the ICenyanisation Board will let you have ' one of each' (kind of 
supervisor) but not a second or a third. The transactions between the Board 
and the firm form a highly political bargaining process; this bias is certainly 
possible. Nevertheless, it does seem just as possible that the firm could argue 
that it could produce a higher output at lower average cost and employ more 
unskilled Kenya citizens if it were allowed additional work permits. More 
important, notice that the rationing mechanism is not rationing supervisors; it is 
rationing non-citizen supervisors. Presumably there is some price at which a 
firm could lure a citizen supervisor away from another firm or train one itself 
and pay him enough to keep him from getting hired. Expatriates (particularly those 
from the U.S., Britain and Western Europe who make up a significant fraction of the 
non—citizen personnel in the category under discussion) are very expensive when 
passages, home leave, housing and other fringe benefits are taken into account. 
3) Drop in productivity, More than half of the manufacturers 
interviewed felt that productivity definitely dropped on the night shift, particularly 
on the 'graveyard8 shift in the very early morning hours. Sometimes this was 
considered to be the case under exactly the same conditions of supervision as 
on the day shift. Everybody, including the supervisors, was sleepy; night workers 
were more likely to come to work drunk. Workers might have other jobs in the 
daytime (this may seem unlikely given the high unemployment rates in Kenya; 
it was said only of workers in certain skill categories which were in short supply). 
But sometimes the drop in productivity was closely related to item 2 above, the 
difficulty in getting proper supervision on the night shift. The interviews 
suggest that Kenya firms sometimes have a choice between accepting a lower level 
of supervision on the night shift and an attendant fall in productivity* and 




4) Breakages, accidents, theft. Many firms maintained that there were 
more breakages of machinery, more mistakes resulting in damaged output, etc« 
on the night shift, l'lor example, one finn has bad two disastrous fires both 
started on the night shifty In another firm, in one operation which is carried out 
on the night shift, productivity as such cannot fall, because of the nature of the 
process, but it is on the night shift thyt the wrong dye is put in, or too much of 
a chemical, so that occasionally a whole batch has to be discarded* Theft was 
also reported to be more of •< probl m. on night shifts, probably relating to the 
supervision problem to some extent® A manufacturer of small easily concealed consumer 
goods had his workers checked one night and discovered that 26 out of 27 were carrying 
stolen goods. It was argued that the presence of high-level management in the ' 
day time,, even though the managers had no direct role in factory supervision, had a 
deterrent effect on theft, 
5) Cost of providing tcanapoi. i |gr night workers* Uight public transport 
was poor or non-existent in the u>jjot i ivhvc jjrial s uivau oi Kenya at the time of xne study 
More important, workers wore afraid q£ being attacked and robbed on their way home 
after dark» In seme industries, a requirement of free transport for night shift workers 
was already written into the •ll. a >. at.' • 
For simplicity, we have been talking as if there is one jump in costs from 
the 'day shift*to the 'night shift". The interviews suggest that there may be 
three for many firms. There is likely to be an additional drop in productivity in 
going from the second to the thi <m shifty TUt-ii, to go beyond three 45-hour shifts per 
week entails working on Saturday night anrt Sunday. This requires the firm to pay 
overtime rates at double time or to secure union agreement to have some workers work 
Sundays as part of normal working hours, getting their time off at some other time 
in the week. The unions have not been cooperative in giving this agreement, so 
practically speaking, most firms face a 100 per cent addition to the base wage in 
going beyond three shift operations 
The Mature of the Technology 
The following generalisations can be made, based on the author''£> 
observations and the research of Howard Pack: on capita L=>labour substitution and 
the technology of Kenya manufacturing firms„ The degree of potential sub-
stitutability between capital and labour suite es from, industry to industry 
and process to process9 but the assumption of fixed coefficients iex pogt is generally 
valid, especially as it re'J a tea to changes • between night and day shifts, when 
production is looked at in terms of individual processes. The number of 
people in the factory is of ten consider-ably smal Ler on the night shift even within 
individual sections of the factory but lb is generally because certain vninor tasks 
are performed only on the Jay ;>! if o4{..: sweeping'; up, shifting of raw materials. 
9 
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from one location to another,, etc,; the number of workers operating a 
particular piece of equipment is almost never variable* 
The minimum size of plant factor is very important,, In the sixties, 
considerable investment in manufacturing took place behind the tariff barriers 
of the East African Community * The East African market is small;, and in the 
last few years there have been increasing problems in trade within, the Community, 
because Uganda and Tanzania have felt that Kenya has been receiving the lion's 
share of the benefits of the 0 immunity. By 1971, transfer taxes, quantitative 
restrictions and payment delays were hamper-trig Kenyan exports to partner states. 
In a number of cases, businessmen had seen the writing on the wall ahead of time 
and already had minimum-sized plants in each of the three East African countries,, 
each operating at less than full utilisation* 
In the new Kenya tire factory, there is a machine which represents a 
large fraction of total capital cost which is used for only a few hours a week. 
A ceramics factory would be producing enough to supply the entire continent of 
Africa if it were working the maximum possible hours. Many more examples could 
be cited® 
Validity of Predictions of Models 
As already reported, the managers said that th re were significant night 
shift costs of the types described above. On a quantitative basis, the interviews 
suggest that the firms are quite sensitive to these coats. The models predict 
that for given shift costs, more capital-intensive operations will be operated 
for longer hours than less capital-intensive operations. We found that firms 
in relatively labour-intensive industries such as furniture making, radio 
assembly and clothing manufacture generally planned to work only one shift, where;,. 
in capital-intensive industries such as flour milling, firms planned to run. 
several shifts. 
The extent to which firms optimised at the process level was interesting. 
It was the rule rather than the exception for firms to r>ui expensive machinery on 
a two or three-shift basis, while running labour-intensive operations like 
packing on a one-shift basis* 
It was encouragingj although .not conclusive, that firms frequently 
explained their behaviour with respect to shifts in terms of,whether or not it 
was 'worth it' to run a night shift, weighing the extra costs involved against 'lie 
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savings on machinery. Sometimes they argued forcefully that shift costs had no 
impact on their decision, but this may only have meant that they were so clearly 
within the range of one or three-shift operation that the decision was probably 
virtually automatic. For example, one clothing manufacturer argued that 'cost had 
nothing to do with it1. He would not consider running more shifts under any cir-
cumstances because he liked a quiet life and wanted time to be with his family 
and would not want to have to woriy about what was happening on the night shift, 
etc. But when asked what he would do if sewing machines cost ten times as much, he 
said, of course, that would be quite a different situation, and then he would have 
to run shifts. The statistical tests are consistent with these qualitative 
conclusions. (Results can be found in chapter 3.) 
POLICY 0QUOLUSIONS 
When there are differential shift costs, if firms are forced to run 
extra shifts their average cost will actually go up. To the extent that the 
shift costs are real, then the firms are behaving rationally and should not be 
forced to increase hours. However, their perception of the costs may be in-
accurate. They may believe that productivity falls, breakages and supervision 
difficulties would be worse than they actually would be. We found surprising 
uniformity in planned hours among firms producing similar products (although actual 
hours varied a great deal), but occasionally a manager would predict huge drops in 
productivity, insuperable supervision problems and the like if he ran a night 
shift when another firm in the same industry was running night shifts with no 
difficulties at all. Thus, there might be value in publicising firms which run 
more than one shift and in asking for figures to justify a decision to run less 
than three shifts when evaluating investment projects, to make sure that the 
possibility of shift work has been carefully considered. This will be particularly 
important in non-competitive industries. 
Shift costs can also be acted upon directly by Government policy. 
Night transportation facilities in the major industrial areas should be improved. 
For example, at the time when this research was done (summer and fall of 1972), 
there was no night bus service in the Nairobi Industrial Area and none was 
contemplated, as far as we could determine. It ought to be cheaper for Kenya 
Bus Services to provide transport than for individual firms to provide it, since 
one single medium-sized firm may find that its workers live in widely scattered 
places. (This would lead to more efficient use of buses also.) Government should 
do what it can to resist trade union attempts to increase shift allowances. The 
fact that shift allowances are not common at the present time should not lull 
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anyone into a false sense of security. Several firms reported that they expected 
the question of a shift allowance to come up soon in their negotiations with the 
unions. Pressure should also be exerted on the unions to make Sunday working 
possible at normal pay rates. It may well be very desirable that workers should 
have a full day of rest per week, but it is not clear why this has to be Sunday. 
The main policy significance of the shift differential models is the 
importance of the factor-price ratio. Even where technology seems to be most 
rigid--in the case of the ex ante fixed coefficients production function where 
the hourly flow capital/labour ratio is fixed—there is a dimension f-varying 
the ratios of capital stock to labour and output through the utilisation rate. 
In Kenya, as in many less developed countries, the problem is not so 
much of one of adding good policies as of eliminating bad policies. For example, 
Kenya imports nearly all of her manufacturing machinery and a small country 
faces a very elastic supply curve for such good. An over-valued exchange rate 
is defined by high tariffs on consumption goods, with no tariffs on capital goods. 
As a result of these policies the cost of capital is lowefd via P, the purchase 
price. Another price-distorting policy is the investment incentive. Firms are 
allowed an investment deduction of 20 per cent on new buildings and machinery 
in the year of investment, which lowers the cost of capital through the resultant 
tax saving. 
It is generally agreed that in Kenya the wages of at least some types 
of labour are higher than the social opportunity cost. There is considerable 
difference of opinion as to why this is so and ^hat if anything can be done about 
the level of wages in the manufacturing sector which we will not discuss here. 
But to the extent that wages can be kept down, efficient capital utilisation will 
be encouraged. It would not be a good idea to affect utilisation rates by 
direct controls, since the information and enforcement costs of these would 
probably make them unworkable. 
A very common explanation given for operating at low utilisation 
rates was inadequate market demand for their output. When asked why they had 
purchased the excess capital equipment, sometimes they replied that their demand 
forecasts had proved to be wrong. The trade problems within the East African 
Community were the usual cause of this. But the other important reason given 
was the 'minimum size of plant' argument. It was not possible to examine the 
technology available to each firm in detail to decide whether this was really 
true. It was originally hoped that data could be collected on how many hours the 
firm actually expected to be operating the equipment.in 1971, when it made the 
investment decision (as opposed to the maximum number it would operate before 
buying additional equipment). 
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When there is a minimum size of plant, it is not the technology that 
is the problem but the determination of output, If output is less than the full 
utilisation output, the firm is operating on the downward sloping part of its' 
average cost curve and can increase profits by increasing outputs Thus we hoped 
to be able to see if differences between planned hours (in the sense of chapter 3) 
and expected hours (in the sense above) were correlated with various measures of 
market conditions. 
However, it proved difficult to distinguish between excess capacity 
that was expected and the excess capacity that actually occured0 Firms have a 
tendency to buy the minimum size of plant with the hazy idea that they will be 
using it to capacity 'pretty soon'. Each year they revise their opinion of how 
soon, and the expectations on which the purchase of the equipment was based are 
lost in the past. Usually the firms' demand forecasts had proved to be too 
optimistic and they were operating fewer hours than they had expected, but not 
always. In one interesting case, a firm owned a very expensive machine which 
they used only two hours a week. The manager said he would use the machine for 
166 hours a week (the maximum potential hours) before buying another one, if he 
could sell the output. Yet, when the machine was purchased in the mid-sixties, 
it was expected that by 1971 the firm would be using it only two hours every other 
week—and selling output at a much higher price. Since then, several other firms 
had entered the market, and competed the price down* 
To the extent that the minimum size of plant factor _is a feature of 
technology, then, given the small size of the Kenya market, for many products the 
alternatives are to import.the product, to put up with anticipated excess capacity 
or to export on the world market. Since Kenya is a small country, in many 
commodities if it could meet the.going world price and solve the initial entry 
problems, it could sell as much as it wanted,, 
Government should pursue policies which lead to an economic environment 
in which there are not incentives to set up firms operating at less than full 
utilisation and there, are incentives to export, Kenya trade policies have tended 
to encourage firms to stay in the protected hone market and to discourage them 
from exporting, A general rationalisation of trade policy, perhaps along the 
lines suggested by John Power of a uniform tariff, uniform domestic value added 
tax and direct subsidies where needed, would have a profound effect in the long 
run on excess capacity. At the very least, a significant export subsidy would 
help to correct some of the bias against exports. 
It is frequently argued that the need to avoid excess capacity is 
precisely the reason why protective tariffs Eire necessary. If operating at 
capacity, the argument runs, the firm would be competitive with imports. To operate 
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at capacity the firm would have to have the whole Kenya market, Because of 
brand loyalty or the snob appeal of imports, or what have you, the firm cannot 
get the whole domestic market, unless Imports are restricted either by a ban on 
imports or tariff protection. Thus the tariff will enable a viable domestic 
industry to be established and will prevent excess capacity« In the interviews, 
we came across some fascinating examples of the (quite predictable) perverse 
results such a policy can have. 
Consider, for example, this case from an industry producing an inter-
mediate good. The industry lias an effective rate of protection of approximately 50 
per o .. I in the Phelps-Wasow study. In one particular line, an old 
established firm had been supplying the product for years. Then a new firm was 
established; the old firm immediately dropped its price by nearly 50 per cent. 
Two years of fierce competition ensued, with both firms losing money. Even-
tually, of course, they got together and set a price that makes them both happy. 
And both are operating at less than capacity. The same firm is about to start 
making a product that has always been supplied by a very large firm. The latter 
threatened to 'kill' the small firm, but it is going in anyway, and expects 
that the two firms will eventually reach a compromise and set price or quotas. 
At the same time, firms frequently mention the high cost of this product in 
discussing their problems in competing on the export market. 
The paint industry is another such case, Paint has an effective rate 
of protection of 95.1 per cent-, Por some years there have been five firms in the 
paint industry, all operating below capacity. These firms belong to the Paint 
Manufacturers Association, which sets the price of paint and the conditions 
under which it is sold (e.g», maximum discounts). Recently two new paint 
factories have been set up; these do not belong to the Association and have been 
setting very low prices, and out-competing the other firms on government tenders. 
In the short run, some people are getting cheaper paint—in the long run, what 
will happen? Probably, these two firms will join the Association; a new price 
will be set, and it will have to be higher, so that firms can continue to get 
their normal return while each firm has more excess capacity. 
The profits in this industry will not be particularly high, Some of 
course will be siphoned off into the excess capacity. In addition, when the 
firms agree not to compete on price, they start competing in other ways-- product 
differentiation via customer services, advertising (Who sponsors expensive tv pro-
grammes? —paint firms), so that one firm said that selling and marketing costs 
were considerably higher than 'works cost' (the manufacturing costs in the factory). 
It may be, as this firm argued, that the customers are willing to pay extra for 
all this service. If so, the industry does not need its high tariff. 
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Should new entry be forbidden? Then what is to prevent the existing 
firms from making monopoly profits? The practical difficulties of price controls 
and profit ceilings are immense. In Kenya, the firms are particularly likely to 
take their monopoly profits in inefficiency,, On the other hand, if a new entry is 
allowed excess capacity results rather than lower prices in the long run. The 
fact that this new entry takes place suggests that there is entrepreneurial talent and 
investment capital ready to respond to incentives. What a pity the incentives are 
the wrong ones. 
Firms must be able to meet world prices if they are to export; thus 
changes in tariff and exchange rate policies and/or export subsidies are of major 
importance. Nevertheless, the effect of such changes will be considerably-
strengthened if they are combined with serious export promotion efforts. The cost of 
entry for an individual firm into the world market may be large. Significant 
economies in these costs might be achieved through an adequately funded export 
promotion body witty experienced professional staff., The present Export Promotion 
Council is under- staffed and under-financed* 
Some areas of particular importance for action are; 
1) Export insurance. Exporters in developed countries can get export 
Insurance to places like Nigeria, so they do not have to bear the risks of 
non-payment. Kenya exporters cannot. Since the risk of non-payment, etc. is great 
in shipping to countries in Africa and since these countries are natural markets 
for Kenya products, a workable insurance system would probably have a significant 
impact. Firms reported that they would require a larger profit margin on export 
deals to allow for the fact that some deals would go sour—yet to compete on 
price with the current over-valued exchange rate, they would usually have to sell 
at a lower price than the domestic pricea ' 
The rates for such insurance neednot be especially high. In Europe, 
the insurance firm tends to set a reasonable rate or to refuse to insure at all0 
The deals are less risky to the insurance firm than to the individual exporter 
because the insurance firm can investigate the credit rating of the buyers 
moreover, the buyer is more careful to avoid non-payment because of the risk that 
the insurance companies will refuse to insure his order and he will then be 
unable to get imports on credit in the futurea 
2) Information about markets. The Export Promotion Council has made 
efforts in this area, but they are not sufficient. One firm questioned the priorities 
reflected in sending a twelve-man mission to tiny Mauritius, but doing nothing at 
all about Nigeria, which has 40 million people. 
- 15 -
3) Foreign exchange for marketing trips. Exporting firms reported 
that they had great difficulty getting foreign exchange for such trips, yet to 
develop an export business they needed to visit potential markets, especially 
given the lack of information in Kenya, Obviously, the Central Bank is worried 
about loss of foreign exchange because such trips are used as a cloak for pleasure 
trips. Yet this seems to us to be a very short-sighted policy. As long as the 
permission for such trips is very closely tied to results—you get one or two 
trips 'on spec', but after that you have to be able to show that you have actually 
exported significant amounts and that your trips are producing orders—then it 
should be relatively easy to get approval. So what if some businessmen spend 
time enjoying the sights as well as getting orders, as long as they get the 
orders. It may well be, with the present exchange control policies, that the 
prospect of being able to take a trip to Europe would be a stronger incentive 
to the manager of a medium-size firm to export than a straight financial incentive, 
4) General administrative delays. Because the world market is so much 
more competitive than the domestic market, exporters must be able to supply the 
goods on time and at the right price. But Government red tape, particularly 
that associated with trade policy, may make this very difficult. 3? or example, 
one garment manufacturer applied for an import license for cloth for a trial export 
order to Europe. Although he applied in plenty of time to get the license, and 
there was no question of it being refused, there was such a long delay that he 
was unable to get the cloth in time. He had to buy the material from local traders 
at a higher price because he did not dare jeopardise future business by failing 
to meet his commitment; he lost a significant amount on the transaction* 
The significant factors affecting actual utilisation rates and common 
to a number of industries are the trade problems in the East African Community 
(which have already been mentioned) and delays and red tape in the administration 
of Government policies, particularly trade policies. In considering the impact 
of Government policies, economists frequently ignore the problems of administering 
them effectively as of second order importance*, This is a mistake in Kenya, 
where the shortage of skilled manpower makes it inevitable that the administration 
of complex regulations should present serious difficulties. 
We collected many anecdotes about these difficulties. A representative 
selection of them is presented below. They suggest the large gains that could 
be achieved by simplifying the rules.—both by enabling firms to plan more 
efficiently and by releasing Government manpower for other tasks. 
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Examples of Administrative Difficulties; Many firms reported difficulties with 
import licensing. The 1972 increase in the number of items that were absolutely 
banned cduplicated things immensely. There Eire thousands of commodities entering 
into international trade and government staff cannot possibly be familiar with 
every single one. Thus there were frequently long delays in granting import 
licenses, and the flow of raw materials was interrupted. One firm had to close 
down its factory for a time during the summer of 1972 because it had been issued a 
license to import the wrong material. Another firm, which exports 95 .per cent 
of its output feared that it might have to close part of its plant because the 
special dye needed (not manufactured in Kenya) was classified as paint and 
therefore the firm had not been able to get a license. The dye was sitting in 
the port costing rent. 
Another firm produces cattle dip. One of the inputs is technically 
called a detergent. Detergents were banned imports, but this is a special type 
which was not produced in Kenya. After much red tape, the firm was given a quota 
which was significantly less than it needed, as well as much delayed^ so there 
was a real possibility of the firm running out of the item. At the same time, 
Government was spending time and money persuading people to dip their cattlei 
Time and pgain, we were told that a product was banned because someone 
had said he was going to produce it. Then he did not get started, and meanwhile 
no one could import it, so production was held up in other firms. The red tape 
involved in convincing Government that the item was not being produced was 
incredible. For example, a firm has large foot-pedal type stapling machines for 
stapling cardboard boxes. It was refused permission to import staples on the 
grounds that they were produced in Kenya. It corresponded with the staple firm 
and established that the firm could not make this particular type. (The staple 
firm implied that the firm should buy new stapling machines.) Armed with a 
letter to this effect, the firm submitted indents requesting permission to import. 
The indents were returned because the SITO number was not shown. The number was 
added, neatly, in ink; the indents were again returned, with a note to the effect 
that the number had to be typed. An entire new set of iindents ,/as submitted. 
This time they were returned because the paper was too short. The indents were 
finally submitted on longer paper and at this point the order had already been 
delayed three months. 
There were restrictions on buttons and zips because firms in the 
Industrial Estate were making these items. But they made only a few types. In 
quality garment malting, e,g. ladies® dresses, variety in trimming is essential 
if the products are to compete with imports and be exported. 
- 17 
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Import licenses were only good for four months; if the goods did not 
arrive in time, and this frequently happened, the license had to be renewed. 
There could be lengthy delays in renewal. All this delay and uncertainty-
surrounding the import of raw materials not only makes it difficult to plan 
production, it also makes it necessary for firms to hold larger input stocks and 
thus increases working capital requirements,, 
When there are large fluctuations in demand, extra capacity must be kept 
on hand for peak periods, and over-time must be paid. Thus firms which sell to 
Government would like to see orders placed in good time so that production can 
be planned ahead* For example, the Jute Control Board failed to place orders for 
gunny bags between April and July of 1971, and then placed very large orders. The 
company that produces the bags worked below capacity for part of the year and then 
had to do substantial over-time for the rest of the year. For historical reasons, 
this firm is subject to very high over-time rates (twice the basic rate on week-
days and two-and-a-half times on Sundays and holidays, compared to one-and-a-half 
and two times for other firms), so costs were raised considerably, (lleported in 
jLvast African standard,, August 31, 1972.) The printing industry is subject to 
large fluctuations in demand. If Government WOUJLU uet U0ou Wi.in tne book 
publishers' association and decide earlier on its orders for educational books 
so that more notice could be given to the printers, they could spread the work 
better0 
We heard many complaints about the administration of work permits. A 
shortage of skilled and supervisory personnel was often said to be a major factor 
causing under-utilisation of capital and low productivity. The problem may be 
exaggerated since nearly all the managers of manufacturing firms are non-Africans, 
and in any case the Kenya Government has decided that the long-run benefits of 
Kenyanisation are worth the short-run costs. Nevertheless, the more efficient the 
administration of Kenyanisation policies, the lower the cost is likely to be. 
For example,- a firm has foundry equipment which is not in use because 
the expert foundryman they planned to employ was not available after all. There 
is no citizen available for the work, and they have tried to recruit someone in 
Europe. The Kenyanisation of personnel people do not query their need for an 
expatriate, but the delay between finding the person and getting his work permit is 
so long that candidates are not willing to hold themselves available. The manager 
wants to know why he cannot be given a work permit for a person of specified 
qualifications and sign the man on the spot* 
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Finally, we came across several cases where firms were promised protection 
and bought machinery on that basis. Then they did not get protection ai' were f 
left with excess capacity. We have no sympathy for their failure to get protection, 
but c? early it would have been better not to promise the protection in the first 
place and thus avoid the excess capacity. 
Garments and Made-Up Textiles 
In garments and made-up textiles, there is a nice contrast between garment 
garments and canvas products (e.g. tents) on the one hand, and blankets on the 
other. In the first, there is no indivisibility in the technology and capital 
costs are small relative to labour costs. Firms generally plan to run one shift 
now and in the future. In general, firms do not face a market constraint although 
one large shirt manufacturer reported excess capacity because the factory had 
been set up to serve the East African Community and the expected demand had not 
materialised. 
The firms have difficulty exporting because the price is high and 
therefore it is difficult to compete in lines like safari suits where there 
is a special promotion aspect. Since there are high duties on inputs, the duty 
drawback makes a lot of difference to this industry, but there is the usual red 
tape and the firms do not get back the full amount of the duty they pay. In 
making men's shirts, 20 per cent of the cloth is wasted in cutting; this amount 
is deducted before the drawback is calculated. A firm making quality garments for 
export uses high quality fabrics and pays duty at M-5 per cent; the duty is refunded 
at the lower rate of shs 3 per metre. It does not get a drawback on trimmings. 
An export subsidy would probably make a significant difference to this industry. 
T.3 manufacture of blankets is a more capital-intensive operation and 
the factories are designed to operate on a three-shift basis. However, there is 
excess capacity in the industry because of serious market problems. Although 
blankets were subject to industrial licensing, too many factories were set up. 
The product is too high cost for its low quality to compete on the export market, 
even with a subsidy. 
Rubber and Rubber Products 
The industry divides into two main parts: tyres and consumer goods 
such as rubber footwear. Both are capital-intensive and nearly all firms reported 




'fhe footwear side of the industry has been hit hard by the restrictions 
on trade with the rest of East Africa. Export subsidies and export promotion 
would help to improve utilisation. 
The situation in the tyre market illustrates perfectly the perverse 
effects of import substitution through protection. The manufacture of new tyres 
is highly capital-intensivej economies of scale and minimum size of plant 
considerations are very important, As of 1972 the new Firestone factory was pro-
ducing 600 tyres a day, compared to factories in Europe which produce 40,000 tyres 
a day, Although the factory had been running on a three-shift basis from the 
start, some of the most expensive machines ran many fewer hours a week. Needless 
to say, the tyres produced are expensive aid must be protected; at the present 
the import of new tyres is restricted. 
There is a well established retreading industry in Kenya, The high 
price of new tyres will stimulate the demand for retreads, but to make retreads 
one needs used tyres. Thus the production of retreads depends on the supply of 
new tyres in the country and the import of used tyre casings. There is a surplus 
of used casings in the world market, since the structure of tyre demand in de-
veloped countries favours new tyres. The import of casings was discouraged in 
the past by the fact that the duty on tyres, whether new or old, was paid by 
weight, so that it was much higher in percentage terms on used casings. In 1972, 
the import of casings was restricted in an attempt to restrict the supply of 
retreads and thus protect Firestone's market. Retreading firms saw rough days ahead. 
Not only has a new factory operating at much less than capacity been 
set up behind a wall of protection to produce an essential product at a high price. 
Excess capacity is also being created in an existing industry producing a lower-
priced substitute , The most chilling fact about all this is that there are going 
to be a lot more bald tyres on the roads9 particularly on the wheels of passenger 
taxis. Protectionist import substitution policies are going to cost lives as 
well as money. 
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